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I. Purpose 
 
Long-duration, deep space missions represent a set of unique challenges to the human system that need to be 
taken into account in the course of planning and developing Design Reference Mission (DRM4)-like mission 
architectures under the Human Exploration Framework Team (HEFT) activity.  This white paper addresses the 
most significant human system challenges from a mission architecture point of view by classifying each of these 
challenges into one of three areas: 
1. Mission Duration Limiting 
2. Major Drivers of Mission Resources (Mass, Power, Volume) 
3. Minor Drivers of Mission Resources (Mass, Power, Volume) 
 
We hope that this white paper allows the HEFT missions planners to readily identify and take into account the 
most significant human system challenges during mission architectures development.  Since many of the human 
system challenges are the focus of ongoing research activities, we also hope that this white paper will facilitate a 
structured discussion on the need to reduce or mitigate human system risks and challenges to better enable long-
duration, deep space missions. 
II. Introduction 
 
Evaluation of DRM4 in terms of the human system includes the ability to meet NASA standards, the inclusion of 
the human system in the design trade space, preparation for future missions and consideration of a robotic 
precursor mission.  Ensuring both the safety and the performance capability of the human system depends upon 
satisfying NASA Space Flight Human System Standards.1
 
 These standards in turn drive the development of 
program-specific requirements for Near-earth Object (NEO) missions.   
In evaluating DRM4 in terms of these human system standards, the currently existing risk models, technologies 
and biological countermeasures were used.  A summary of this evaluation is provided below in a structure that 
supports a mission architecture planning activities. 
1. Unacceptable Level of Risk 
The duration of the DRM4 mission leads to an unacceptable level of risk for two aspects of human system health: 
  
A. The permissible exposure limit for space flight radiation exposure (a human system standard) 
would be exceeded by DRM4.  
 
B. The risk of visual alterations and abnormally high intracranial pressure would be too high. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 NASA Standard 3001, Volume I, Crew Health, which sets standards for fitness for duty, space flight permissible exposure 
limits (PEL), permissible outcome limits (POL), levels of medical care, medical diagnosis, intervention, treatment and care, and 
countermeasures; and Volume  II , Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health,  focuses on human physical and 
cognitive capabilities and limitations and defines standards for spacecraft (including orbiters, habitats, and suits), internal 
environments, facilities, payloads, and related equipment, hardware, and software systems with which the crew interfaces 
during space operations.  
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2. Significant Effect on Resources 
Several human system requirements have a significant effect on DRM4 resources such as the mass, volume, and 
power requirements of vehicular subsystems:   
 
A. Behavioral health requirements drive the habitable volume. 
B. Exercise equipment is necessary to address bone, muscle, and cardiovascular risks associated with 
long-duration missions in the microgravity environment of space.  Current ISS exercise equipment 
is too large and heavy to be used on a DRM4 mission. 
C. Food packing technology affects the mass and volume of food storage, the amount of trash 
generated, and the variety of foods available. 
D. The medical system must monitor and treat crewmembers during the mission.  The requirements 
for this medical system are impacted by the following: age and gender of the crew; crew medical 
expertise (an experienced field physician would greatly reduce the requirements); and 
requirements to conduct in situ analysis and return biological samples to assess human system 
response to the mission in order to efficiently mitigate risks in future missions. 
E. Inclusion of an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) suit port in DRM4 drastically reduces the risk of 
habitat contamination by dust or volatiles, but geological sample handling and storage in the 
inhabited volumes raise that risk. The Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) and 
its consumables must be sized to treat the expected amount of dust or volatiles. 
F. Availability of abort options and their transit time back to Earth affects the supplies needed to 
sustain ill or injured crew. The abort options also affect psychological aspects of the mission.  
 
3. Secondary Effect on Resources 
Several human system requirements are critical for the safe and effective execution of a DRM4 type mission, but 
have only secondary effects on DRM4 resources such as the mass, volume, and power requirements of vehicular 
subsystems: 
 
A. The need for long shelf life for food, pharmaceuticals, environmental monitoring expendables, 
etc. can require special storage conditions. 
B. Several health and performance risks are affected by the crew composition, e.g., the age and 
gender. The radiation carcinogenesis risk (and, therefore, mission duration) depends strongly on 
age and, in the current version, gender. The size of the medical system will be influenced by 
gender makeup of the crew.  
C. The risk of decompression sickness and the operational time lost to pre-breathe protocols are 
driven in large part by the design of the EVA glove or its equivalent.   
D. The size and capability of autonomous systems aboard the vehicle will be driven by the manner in 
which the functions needed for high level mission tasks are assigned to some combination of the 
flight crew, ground crew, and autonomous systems. 
E. Many other secondary drivers of DRM duration and resources result from the quantification and 
mitigation of the human system risks addressed by the Human Research Program (HRP).  A list of 
the exploration risks that the HRP is addressing is provided to provide a sense of the diversity of 
drivers.  
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III. Mission Duration Limiting
1. Radiation
NASA’s radiation exposure standards permit a 3% risk of Radiation Exposure-Induced Death (REID). This standard 
limits mission durations at solar minimum to 5-6 months for males and approximately 3 months for females. At 
solar maximum, the recommended limits become 154 days for 35-year old females to 300 days for 55-year old 
males.  
The NEO mission may occur during solar maximum, which may be relatively weak. 
Longer allowed mission durations would result from less conservative assumptions in the radiation carcinogenesis 
model. For example, REID would be reduced by accounting for the more comprehensive cancer surveillance 
program available to the astronaut corps, and by projecting an increase in survivability as medical knowledge and 
technology advances. Longer allowed mission durations might also result as further research decreases in the 
uncertainties of the risk estimates.  
Maximum Mission Lengths with 95% CI in Deep Space 
Solar Minimum for 20 g/cm2 (7.4 inch thick) Aluminum Shield
8
*Based on NCRP 132 Report (2000)
**NASA update based largely on UNSCEAR report. Larger difference for Females occur due to Lung
transfer model from Japanese to US assumptions in BEIR vs NCRP model
Current NASA
Model*
NAS-BEIRVII** Recommended 
NASA update
Age, yr Males
35 158 159 140
45 207 161 150
55 302 174 169
Age, yr Females
35 129 109 88
45 173 111 97
55 259 122 113
Maximum Mission Lengths with 95% CI in Deep Space
Solar Max  with SPE for 20 g/cm2 (7.4 inch thick) Aluminum Shield
9
Current NASA
Model*
NAS-BEIRVII** Recommended 
NASA update
Age, yr Males
35 228 248 247
45 303 256 268
55 443 273 300
Age, yr Females
35 187 169 154
45 252 176 171
55 379 194 196
*Based on NCRP 132 Report (2000).
** NAS Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) VII Report. 
NASA update based largely on United Nations (UNSCEAR) report. Larger difference for Females occur 
due to Lung transfer model from Japanese to US assumptions in BEIR vs NCRP model
Comparison of Safe Days at Higher Acceptable Risk Levels
Solar Min for 20 g/cm2 (7.4 inch thick) Aluminum Shield
11
3% Risk
(REID)
6% Risk
(REID)
Age, y Males
35 140 290
45 150 311
55 169 349
Age, y Females
35 88 187
45 97 206
55 113 234
Number of Days in Deep Space At Solar minimum with a  95% Confidence Level 
to be below 3% or 6% Risk of Cancer Death*
* Results are marginally non-linear with increasing Risk levels because competing causes of death compress
higher risk samples 
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2. Microgravity-Induced Visual Alterations/Intracranial Pressure
A JSC Space Life Sciences Directorate top programmatic risk, On-Orbit Intracranial Hypertension (risk #6169), 
would limit NEO missions to six months or less. 20% of long duration Internal Space Station (ISS) crewmembers 
have experienced clinical symptoms. Observed physical findings in long-duration crewmembers include 
papilledema, choroidal folds, increased optic nerve sheath diameter, and a posterior flattened globe; some of 
these changes were temporary and others permanent. There is a high probability that all astronauts have 
idiopathic intracranial hypertension to some degree, and that those susceptible (via eye architecture, anatomy, 
narrow disc) have a high likelihood of developing either choroidal folds or papilledema, and that the degree of 
that edema will determine long-term or permanent vision loss, sequelae, or impairment. This risk is under active 
investigation. 
IV. Major Drivers of DRM Resources (Mass, Power, Volume)
3. Behavioral Health⇒ Habitable Volume
The habitable volume must be large enough and sufficiently designed to execute the necessary tasks and to 
provide a psychologically acceptable space for the long period of confinement. This risk of adverse behavioral 
health events is significant: based on estimates made for the Mission Architecture Working Group, the probability 
of an adverse behavioral health event is 2% and 5% for 3 month and 6 month missions, respectively. A separate 
whitepaper is being prepared to address the issues associated with the habitable volume. 
4. Muscle Atrophy, Cardiovascular Atrophy, Bone Loss⇒ Exercise Equipment
Exercise equipment alleviates muscle atrophy, cardiovascular atrophy, and bone loss. The latest equipment 
deployed on ISS (Treadmill 2, Cycle Ergometer with Vibration Isolation and Stabilization, Advanced Resistive 
Exercise Device) occupies 3 International Standard Payload Racks. Early results suggest that the suite of 
equipment is effective. 
5. Food⇒ Food Storage and Trash Generation
Using current food packaging technology, the amount of food one crew member needs for one year is 670 kg 
occupying 1.7 m3 (the volume of about three household refrigerators). HRP is currently aiming for 30% and 34% 
reductions in volume and mass, respectively. If such reductions are achievable, supplies for one crew member for 
one year are 440 kg and 1.2 m3. Packaging materials must also be disposed. 
6. Medical Care⇒ Medical Equipment and Supplies
The HRP Integrated Medical Model (IMM) simulates medical events during space flight missions and estimates the 
impact of these events on crew health and mission success. A three-crew, 386 day, asteroid mission simulation 
with 28, 2-crew EVAs suggests an optimized medical kit having a mass of 62 kilograms and a volume of 0.15 m3.  
(These figures do not include all of the medical equipment needed for diagnosis). IMM is best used to make 
relative comparison between different missions or sets of resources, but the estimated probability of evacuation 
for this scenario is 9.8% and the probability of loss of crew is 2.8%. Risks on this order of magnitude warrant active 
mitigation. 
7. EVA Airlock or Suitport⇒ ECLSS
Permissible exposure limits mitigate the health risks associated with exposure to asteroid dust and volatiles. The 
scale of the equipment and consumables used for environmental treatment and monitoring depend strongly on 
the architecture. An EVA suitport greatly reduces the risk of contaminating the principal habitable volume 
compared to the use of an EVA airlock. 
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8. Asteroid Characteristics: Dust or Volatiles⇒ ECLSS
Permissible exposure limits mitigate the health risks associated with exposure to asteroid dust and volatiles. An 
asteroid with surface dust or volatile compounds poses a greater environmental risk to the habitable volume.  The 
possibility of such contaminants will necessitate more robust sample handling; sample containment; and 
environmental treatment and monitoring equipment. 
9. Physician Crew Member⇒ Medical Equipment and Supplies
The presence of a physician crew member may have dramatic impact on the resources required to recognize and 
treat an ill or injured crew member. If the crew has substantial medical expertise (e.g., military field physician and 
medic, and training/certification in clinical psychology, behavioral medicine or psychiatry), then there will be less  
need for just-in-time training, on board telemedicine equipment, and expert assistance from the ground. 
10. Abort Options⇒ Medical Equipment and Supplies
The ability to abort during the mission and the time required to return to Earth has affects the supplies needed to 
sustain ill or injured crew. A study of the 1999 AO10 NEO launch opportunity in September 2025 showed that the 
mission could be aborted at almost any time, but would require about a 30 day return trip to Earth. The 
availability of abort options and their transit time back to Earth also has impacts on the psychological aspect of 
the mission. 
V. Secondary Drivers of DRM Resources (Mass, Power, Volume)
1. Extended Shelf-Life for Food and Other Perishables
Food stability and variety are challenges for long duration missions. Shelf life must be calculated from the time the 
food has been prepared and packaged.  The time it takes to ship to the launch site, prepare for launch, spiral out 
to L1 (or other staging area), and await crew arrival needs to be added to what is normally considered mission 
duration (for the crew) when considering the adequacy of the nutrition stability and acceptability of the food.  
Because different foods have different shelf lives, less variety in food is possible in the latter phases of the 
mission. The same shelf life issues apply to pharmaceuticals, environmental monitoring expendables, etc.    
2. Crew Composition
Several health and performance risks are affected by the age and gender of the crew. The radiation carcinogenesis 
risk (driving mission duration) depends strongly on age and, in the current version, gender. The size of medical 
system will be influenced by gender makeup of the crew.  
3. EVA Glove/End Effector
The risk of decompression sickness and the operational time lost to pre-breathe protocols are driven in large part 
by the design of the EVA glove.  The glove drives the pressure of the EVA suit, affects what tools are required, and 
what tasks can be performed.  A glove that can be used at high suit pressures, a mechanical assist within the 
glove, or the replacement of the hand-in-glove by an internal hand operated end effector would allow higher suit 
pressures that reduce the risk of Decompression Sickness (DCS) and minimize the length of pre-breathe protocols. 
4. Crew Autonomy
High level mission tasks must be performed by some combination of the flight crew, ground crew, and 
autonomous systems aboard the vehicle. The communication delays and possible intermittency between the 
Earth and the flight crew will require new techniques to promote the asynchronous interactions between ground 
support and the flight crew and a redesign of tasks to be performed without real time support from the ground. 
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The division of functions between the flight crew and autonomous systems on the vehicle will drive equipment 
needs on the vehicle. 
5. Other 
Many other secondary drivers of DRM mission duration and resources result from the quantification and 
mitigation of the human system risks addressed by the HRP. Some drivers result from the need to quantify the 
level of risk (e.g., estimating the likelihood of decompression sickness from EVAs) while others result from risk 
mitigation approaches (e.g., monitoring of environmental contaminants).  
 
Table 1 below organizes the HRP risks according to the aspect of an exploration mission that they affect the most. 
HRP characterizes the risks in terms of a Criticality Rating: Unacceptable (HRP would recommend against 
conducting the mission), Acceptable (HRP would recommend conducting the mission while continuing to reduce 
the level of risk), or Controlled (HRP would recommend conducting the mission without further efforts to reduce 
the level of risk). The Criticality Ratings of the lunar outpost mission and the Mars mission have been formally 
adopted by HRP; the NEO ratings shown are notional only. 
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TABLE 1. HRP RISKS  Lunar NEO (Notional) Mars 
  6 12 18  
NEO-dependent: NEO-specific properties (i.e., geology, chemistry, angular rotation, g-level and lighting impact task design, regolith handling and sensorimotor issues).    
RISK OF ADVERSE HEALTH EFFECTS FROM LUNAR DUST EXPOSURE A A A A n/a 
RISK OF ERRORS DUE TO POOR TASK DESIGN C A A A A 
RISK OF IMPAIRED CONTROL OF SPACECRAFT, ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS AND IMMEDIATE VEHICLE EGRESS DUE TO VESTIBULAR/SENSORIMOTOR ALTERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH 
SPACE FLIGHT 
C A A A A 
Mission Duration: Conditions continue to worsen with time of exposure to the flight environment (e.g., microgravity, radiation, confined living). 
RISK OF RADIATION CARCINOGENESIS  
RISK OF DEGENERATIVE TISSUE OR OTHER HEALTH EFFECTS FROM RADIATION EXPOSURE 
A U U U U 
RISK OF MICROGRAVITY-INDUCED VISUAL ALTERATIONS/INTRA-CRANIAL PRESSURE U U U U U 
RISK OF ACUTE & LATE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM EFFECTS FROM RADIATION EXPOSURE  
RISK OF ACUTE RADIATION SYNDROMES DUE TO SOLAR PARTICLE EVENTS  
A A A A A 
RISK OF ADVERSE BEHAVIORAL CONDITIONS AND PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS C A A U U 
RISK OF IMPAIRED PERFORMANCE DUE TO REDUCED MUSCLE MASS, STRENGTH & ENDURANCE  
RISK OF REDUCED PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE DUE TO REDUCED AEROBIC CAPACITY  
A A U U U 
RISK OF CREW ADVERSE HEALTH EVENT DUE TO  ALTERED IMMUNE RESPONSE  C C A A A 
RISK OF EARLY ONSET OSTEOPOROSIS DUE TO SPACEFLIGHT C A A A A 
Distance: Distance impacts communication and evacuation. 
RISK OF INABILITY TO ADEQUATELY RECOGNIZE AND TREAT AN ILL OR INJURED CREW MEMBER  A A A U U 
RISK OF PERFORMANCE DECREMENTS DUE TO INADEQUATE COOPERATION, COORDINATION, COMMUNICATION, PSYCHOSOCIAL ADAPTION WITHIN A TEAM  C A A A A 
Vehicle/System Design: Risk related to vehicle or subsystem design; medical issues not related to mission duration. 
RISK OF COMPROMISED EVA CREW HEALTH AND PERFORMANCE DUE TO INADEQUATE EVA SUIT SYSTEMS A A A A A 
RISK OF INADEQUATE NUTRITION  
RISK OF PERFORMANCE DECREMENT AND CREW ILLNESS DUE TO AN INADEQUATE FOOD SYSTEM 
C C A A U 
RISK OF ERROR DUE TO INADEQUATE INFORMATION 
RISK OF REDUCED SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY DUE TO AN INADEQUATELY DESIGNED VEHICLE, ENVIRONMENT, TOOLS OR EQUIPMENT 
C C A A A 
RISK OF THERAPEUTIC FAILURE DUE TO INEFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICATION C C C A A 
RISK OF CARDIAC RHYTHM PROBLEMS  
RISK OF ORTHOSTATIC INTOLERANCE DURING RE-EXPOSURE TO  MICROGRAVITY & RISK OF INTERVERTEBRAL DISC DAMAGE 
C A A A A 
RISK OF RENAL STONE FORMATION  
RISK OF BONE FRACTURE  
RISK OF PERFORMANCE ERRORS DUE TO FATIGUE RESULTING FROM SLEEP LOSS, CIRCADIAN DESYNCHRONIZATION, EXTENDED WAKEFULNESS, AND WORK OVERLOAD 
C C C C C 
RISK OF  ADVERSE HEALTH EFFECTS DUE TO ALTERNATIONS IN HOST-MICROORGANISM INTERACTIONS C A A A A 
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VI. Acronyms 
 
Design Reference Mission (DRM) 
Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS)  
Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA)  
Human Exploration Framework Team (HEFT) 
Human Research Program (HRP) 
Integrated Medical Model (IMM)  
Internal Space Station (ISS)  
Near-earth Object (NEO) 
Radiation Exposure-Induced Death (REID) 
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